# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAL	RD	P	KIRSTEIN	

**Plaintiff** 

Vs,

**COMPLAINT** 

5:19-cv-1012 (LEK/ATB)

JOEL NIESEN MELNICOFF A/K/A
JOEL N. MELNICOFF

Defendant

Plaintiff asks for a trial by jury

New York State }
Onondaga County } ss

Jared P Kirstein, the Plaintiff in this action, complains of the defendant by alleging and showing that:

## NATURE OF ACTION

- This is an action to enforce the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act
   (FDCPA) 15 USC §1692 et seq.
- By way of introduction and context, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
   Act generally prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive,

deceptive, or unfair debt-collection practices. 15 U.S.C.§§ 1692 et seq. Among other things, the FDCPA bans the use of false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable means of collecting a debt, id. §§ 1692e, 1692f. Also among the abusive practices that Congress intended the FDCPA to address was the "problem of 'forum abuse,' an unfair practice in which debt collectors file suit against consumers in courts which are so distant or inconvenient that consumers are unable to appear," hence permitting the debt collector to obtain a default judgment. S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. As a result, Congress adopted venue provisions to ensure that "[a] debt collector who files suit [does] so either where the consumer resides or where the underlying contract was signed." Id.

3. The statute also bars, inter alia, "the false representation of. . . the character. . . or legal status of any debt" 15 USC §1692e(2), as well as taking or threatening to "take any action that cannot legally be taken) 15 USC § 1692e(5), and "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt [.]" 15 USC §1692e(10).

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

4. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 15 USC §1692k (d) and 28 USC §1331. Declaratory relief is available per 28 USC §§ 2201

and 2202. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims per 28 USC § 1367.

5. Venue is proper in this district per 28 USC §1391 (b), as the acts, omissions and transactions that give rise to this action occurred, in substantial part, in this district. Venue is also proper in this district because plaintiff lives in this district, defendants conduct business in this district and the injury occurred in this district.

### **PARTIES**

- 6. At all relevant times:
  - a. Plaintiff Jared P Kirstein ("Kirstein") is an individual, a natural person, who resides in the City of Oneida, Madison County, New York State, within this district,
    - b. Plaintiff is a" consumer" as that term is defined in the FDCPA.
- 7. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, defendant Joel
  Niesen Melnicoff a/k/a Joel N. Melnicoff ("Melnicoff"):
  - a. Is an attorney at law licensed to practice law in the State of New
    York with a place of business in Syracuse, Onondaga County, New
    York, within this district;

- b. regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly ( for profit), debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another by use of the mail, telephone, and the courts of New York and other means of interstate commerce;
- c. Is otherwise a "debt collector" as that term is defined by 15 USC §1692a(6);
- d. Conducts business in this district.

### **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

- 8. On or about and before 10/24/2018, Melnicoff sued Kirstein in the Sherrill City Court. ("state court action")
- The subject of the state court action was money owed for alleged medical services on a quantum meruit basis.
- 10. Whether or not the debt was really Kirstein's, it is an obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, or services are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, hence a "debt" as that term is defined by the FDCPA.

11. A true copy of the summons and complaint Melnicoff filed in the state court action is attached to this as Exhibit 1 (Summons).<sup>1</sup>

## Legal Backdrop

- 12. The Sherrill City Court derives its authority from Article VI, Section 17 of the New York State Constitution, of which we ask the Court to take notice.
- 13. According to the Constitution, city courts outside the city of New York have only those powers and jurisdiction the State Legislature gives to it.
- 14. These powers and jurisdiction are found in the New York State
  Uniform City Court Act (UCCA), of which we ask the Court to take
  notice.
- 15. As such, the Sherrill City Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.
- 16. Geography is one of those limitations. UCCA §213 states in pertinent part:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We apparently did not get the signature page form the Clerk, but presume defendant has it in his possession.

- (a) In an action described in §202,² either a plaintiff or a Defendant *must*:
  - be a resident of the city or of a town contiguous to such city,
     provided that such town is
    - (i) within the same county, and
    - (ii) contiquous to the city by land, and
    - (iii) not within either Nassau or Westchester counties; or
    - 2. have a regular employment within the city; or
    - 3. have a place for the regular transaction of business within the city.
    - (b) A corporation, association or partnership shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed a resident of the city if it has an office or agency or regularly transacts business in the city...
    - (d) The requirements of this section shall not be deemed jurisdictional; they shall be deemed waived by the plaintiff upon his commencing an action in the court, and they shall be deemed waived by the defendant unless he raises the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> UCCA 202 describes an action for the recovery of money.

objection by motion or in his responsive pleading as prescribed in §1002 of this act. Notwithstanding waiver by the parties, the court may, on its own initiative at any time, dismiss an action which does not satisfy the requirements of this section. Any dismissal under this section shall entitle the parties to the benefit of CPLR Section 205, relating to an extension of time to commence a new action. 3

- 17. In other words, to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Sherrill City

  Court, one of the parties must live or work within the City of Sherrill, or

  live in an Oneida County town that is contiguous by land to the City,

  i.e. the Town of Vernon. 4
- 18. Pertinently, a summons may only be served within Oneida County in UCCA §202 actions like the state court action. UCCA §403

## The Summons and Complaint

19. Melnicoff, in the summons, states Kirstein was subject to the Court's jurisdiction per UCCA ¶213 as set forth at paragraph 16 here by stating "Defendant(s) reside in ONEIDA NY 13421, Oneida County."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Emphasis added

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Ex 2, a map of Oneida County

- 20. This statement is false.
- 21. Factually, plaintiff did not live or work in the City of Sherrill or live in Vernon, the only town contiguous by land to it.
- 22. Factually, he did not live in Oneida County.
- 23. In fact, he lived on Cedar Street in the City of Oneida, which is in Madison County. 5
- 24. In fact, he worked in Oneida, Madison County at all relevant times.
- 25. As we are informed and believe, the summons and complaint contained Melnicoff's signature as counsel for the plaintiff in the state court action.
- 26. By signing a summons and complaint, Melnicoff certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, the presentation of the paper or the contentions therein are not frivolous as defined in 22 NYCRR §130-1.1(c). A statement is frivolous under the court rules if, inter alia, it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Ex 3, a printout from the Oneida Assessment Rolls, which we ask the Court to take notice of. The highlights were addred

asserts material factual statements that are false. 22 NYCRR §§ 130-1.1(a) and (c).

- 27. Contrary to the certification, Melnicoff alleged that Kirstein resided within the jurisdiction of City of Sherrill in the summons to establish the Sherrill City Court's jurisdiction over him, when being in possession of actual address he knew or should have known that the statement was false.
- 28. The address Melnicoff used in the Summons, 4914 Hill Road, Oneida, is actually in the Town of Verona.<sup>6</sup>
- 29. Verona is not contiguous by land to the City of Sherrill, separated by the Town of Vernon. ( See Ex 2)
- 30. Indeed, all of the facts in possession of Melnicoff at the time of filing indicated that the action could not be properly filed in Sherill City Court.
- 31. Thus, Melnicoff knew or had reason to know plaintiff did not live in the City of Sherrill, Town of Vernon or Oneida County but ignored that fact.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Ex 4, a printout from the Assessment Rolls of the Town of Verona, which we ask the Court to take notice of. The highlights were added

- 32. Alternatively, Melnicoff made no inquiry into whether plaintiff actually lived in the City of Sherrill or a town contiguous to the City.
- 33. Indeed, Melnicoff knew or had reason to know and was in the position to know that legally, under CPLR §513(a), the Sherrill City Court Clerk would refuse the summons and complaint for filing if the summons alleged Kirstein's proper residence in Madison County, so it deliberately misstated his address in the summons and avoided this fact in its complaint.
- 34. Melnicoff allegedly had Mundorff served at his home in the City of Oneida, Madison County (and not at the address listed on the summons), on or about 10/24/2018. (Ex 5)
- 35. Factually, even after Melnicoff knew Kirstein lived in Madison County, he entered judgment against him in the Sherrill City Court based on the false statements in the complaint.
- 36. Melnicoff did not allege that Kirstein signed a contract or other document evidencing a debt to the putative creditor in the City of Sherrill.
- 37. In fact, the Summons he authored specifically says the "transaction took place in Onondaga County."

## The Judgment and the Court 's Action

- 38. Melnicoff caused a default judgment to be entered against Kirstein on 6/27/2019 in the amount of \$2677.09 in favor of Melnicoff's client.
- 39. A true copy of the judgment roll is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.7
- 40. Kirstein learned about the judgment in July or August 2019 when

  Melnicoff sent him a copy of the judgment. The judgment recited his

  Madison County address. (Ex 6)
- 41. On 8/6/2019, Kirstein informed the Sherill City Court Clerk that he had been living in Madison County all this time and asked the Court to vacate the judgment. Principal among his grounds was that the Sherrill City Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform City Court Act §§ 202 and 213.
- 42. On 8/6/2019, City Court *sua sponte* vacated the judgment and "voided" the state court action for lack of jurisdiction. A true copy of the Sherrill City Court's action is attached to this as Exhibit 78.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> As we are informed and believe, the handwriting on the document is that of the City Court Clerk.

<sup>8</sup> As we are informed and believe, the handwriting on the document is that of the City Court Clerk

### The Fallout

- 43. Melnicoff could have initially sued Kirstein in the Supreme Court for Onondaga or Madison Counties, a court of general jurisdiction, but he did not.
- 44. Melnicoff could have sued Kirstein in the Oneida City Court, but he did not.
- 45. Melnicoff could have discontinued the state court action in Sherrill once he knew Kirstein lived outside the Court's jurisdiction, but he did not.
- 46. As plaintiff is informed and believes, Melnicoff has a business practice and pattern of suing consumer defendants in city courts when one is available without regard to whether or not defendant is under the Court's jurisdiction, as Melnicoff expects no opposition or opposition by a pro se defendant who could not possibly know of UCCA ¶213 and would thus waive any defense thereto.
- 47. Upon information and belief, then, the above acts were frequent,
  persistent and intentional as, inter alia, Melnicoff used a summons and
  complaint in the same form, format and wording in the cases
  referenced above while serving consumers who do not live within the

geographic jurisdiction of the Sherrill City Court or were served outside the geographic limits of process from the Sherrill City Court, or other City Courts in this District.

#### COUNT 1

(Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act-venue)

- 48. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of the preceding paragraphs.
- A9. Defendant's attempt to collect the alleged debt by falsely stating

  Kirstein was subject to the Sherrill City Court's jurisdiction when he

  knew or had reason to know or was in the better position to know

  Kirstein was not, violates 15 USC §§ 1692e, 1692e(5); 1692e(10), 1692f

  and 1692f(1).
- 50. Defendant's actions to collect the alleged debt by suing Kirstein in a judicial district (i.e., the Sherrill City Court) where he does not live nor where the Defendant had any basis to believe the alleged services contract sued upon was signed violates 15 USC §§ 1692i, §1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10); 1692f and 1692f(1).
- Defendants' actions to collect the alleged debt by suing plaintiff in a forum barred by UCCA ¶213 violates 15 USC §§ 1692i, §1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10); 1692f and 1692f(1).

- 52. Upon information and belief, none of the defendant's conduct violating the FDCPA on the foregoing Counts was the result of a *bona fide* error but rather was the result of collection practices and procedures (or lack thereof) not reasonably adopted to avoid such violations.
- 53. Throughout this time the plaintiff Jared P Kirstein felt abused, harassed, confused, bothered, bewildered and anxious, troubled with the furtive ease with which Melnicoff could obtain a judgment against him in a distant court and thus affect his finances, that he could be subject to yet another lawsuit over a debt he disputes, feelings which have affected him in his daily activities from July 2019 to now.

### **JURY DEMAND**

Jared P Kirstein demands a trial by jury of all issues

## WHEREFORE, the plaintiff Jared P Kirstein asks the Court for judgment:

- a. declaring the actions of the defendant in violation of the FDCPA;
- b. awarding him actual damages;
- c. awarding him statutory damages in an amount up to \$1000.00 per 15 USC \$1692k;
- d. awarding him costs and disbursements of this action, and reasonable attorney's fees per 15 USC § 1692k, and
- e. such other, further and different relief as the Court finds proper here.

**DATED:** August 15, 2019

S/Anthony J Pietrafesa

ANTHONY J. PIETRAFESA, ESQ. (102368)

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## **VERIFICATION**

New York State	}
Onondaga County	} ss:
action, I have read the complaint are true to	g duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the plaintiff in this complaint, and the factual allegations contained in the my personal knowledge except for those based on my f, and as to those I believe them to be true.
s/ Jared P Kirstein	
	<del></del>
Sworn to and Subscrib	ped
Before me on 8/15/2	019
s/Anthony J. Pietrafe	sa
Anthony J. Pietrafesa Notary Public Ononda 02PI6155974 My Commission exp. o	